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ABSTRACT 
Availability quantifies the propensity of a system to be functionally 
operative upon demand. It increases if operating times between failures 
(“up times”) are long, and decreases if, following failure or anticipatory 
removal, logistics delays and repair (“down times”) are protracted. This 
chapter summarizes the general availability concept and discusses the 
limitation of operational availability suggesting that mission availability is 




 All mechanical, electrical, nuclear power generation, propulsion, weapons 
systems, computer and data storage systems (both hard and software), communications, 
biological/medical, and many combinations thereof that are designed, manufactured, and 
tested, operated and maintained with human skills, engineering, and scientific knowledge, 
are subject to failure. This means that they become unable to perform the intended design 
function, or mission. Reliability is a measure of the propensity of component, subsystem, 
or system (of systems) to satisfactorily perform a required designed performance function 
on, say, a military or homeland security mission. This includes effectively and promptly 
responding to a natural disaster such as a hurricane (Katrina), tornado, or earthquake. 
During the period of inability to perform, the item is said to be not available or 
unavailable. Often this propensity is quantified as a (conditional) probability, where the 
conditions include stressful aspects of the operational environment and usage. Note that it 
is not customary to include vulnerability to opponent action in measures of military or 
security system reliability. Many, even most, failed systems are subject to failure 
correction or rectification, which often requires a non-negligible total down time, during 
which time interval they are completely or partially unavailable. Thus an initial informal 
definition of availability can be an estimated probability that, at the moment of 
demand/need for a system’s performance, it will furnish that service, and not be in the 
process of awaiting for or being rectified/repaired/replaced. Note that field support of 
system availability and capability to accomplish a mission profile depends upon 
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sustainment resources: personnel, logistics/spare parts, tow vehicles, etc. These must also 
be available when needed. 
It is often true that the failure propensity measure, or hazard, or hazard rate, of a 
component, subsystem, or system eventually increases with time or intensity of usage and 
“wear” or “age” after being fielded. Typically, a new or modified/upgraded system is 
tested so as to identify and remove or reduce the effect of design defects or failure modes; 
during the early testing period every attempt is made to induce the activation, thus 
exposure of, design defects or failure modes, i.e., to stimulate occurrences of failures and 
remove their causes; see [1]. Some faults inevitably remain, and can be found during 
routine scheduled maintenance. However, much such maintenance can be unnecessary 
(time-scheduled maintenance is costly in time and resources, and may well find nothing). 
It is currently thought to be desirable, and increasingly technically feasible, to identify 
and automatically track system health changes: failure-preceding or prognostic events 
(excess heat, undue vibration, wear of say tire treads, tire, engine oil condition, etc.) that 
can signal an incipient failure and thereby suggest needed system design or operational 
changes before total, possibly catastrophic, failure can occur. This procedure is known as 
Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM), and makes use of currently available automated 
embedded sensors; hence CBM+. However, the CBM+ subsystem is itself subject to 
malfunction and failure, so false positive and false negative diagnoses must be 
anticipated and made rare in order for overall gains to be made. Thus the 
reliability/availability of CBM+ must itself be considered as part of the total  
system package. 
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 Accelerated testing procedures are often used at an early (developmental) testing 
stage; see [2]. During the testing phase, both Developmental and Operational, it is 
intended, likely, and desirable, to find design faults and, desirably, “fix” them, so that 
they will not occur/activate and cause mission-abortive events under active field 
conditions. It is the usual objective to test and “fix” until times between failures during 
testing become a stable-in-time random process, often represented by a time-between-
successive-failures distribution, with the further assumption that the times between 
failures are statistically independent (iid random variables=IIDRV); see [2], and several 
computer packages, such as RELIASOFT (www.reliasoft.com). 
 However, initial tests of a newly designed system typically reveal “infant failures” 
that should be removed before any approximate stability of times-between-failures 
occurs. Such removal is referred to as reliability growth, and it has been modeled and 
analyzed extensively, e.g., by [3] and later [4], e.g., in the software package 
RELIASOFT; see also [1] for discussion of testing for growth using a sequential (run of 
successes) stopping rule; such testing is made more complex if the system performance is 
in sequential stages; failure of an early stage may mask the exposure of later stages, thus 
requiring longer tests so as to explore all stages for faults. After (if) there is evidence of 
failure time stochastic stability it is meaningful to speak of the mean (operating) time 
between failures; this is often specified as a reliability metric, but an estimate of the 
probability of mission success is usually more relevant, certainly if the item is a one-shot, 
or is usually-quiescent in performance: a piece of ammunition or a communication 
system for emergencies. Caution is required: justification for such a stable failure-time 
distribution must depend on actual data monitoring, and the currently appropriate 
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particular distributional form (model) may well depend on environmental conditions, 
including maintenance skill, and usage and environment; e.g., operating times between 
successive failures for a particular equipment (helicopter) in the Arctic can be expected to 
differ from those operating under tropical, sandy, desert conditions. 
 Upon failure, some (but not all, e.g., expendable missiles and ammunition) system 
components are repaired; this requires maintenance facilities and personnel, and logistics 
(spare parts); the system may then be again capable of performing designed-for functions. 
Repair or replacement is intended to restore original capability, or possibly upgrade (or, 
in fact, actually unintentionally and occasionally downgrade) system function. Preventive 
maintenance, based on the observed or inferred/sensed physical condition of the system, 
may be used to ward off catastrophic failures. As stated earlier, current attention is being 
focused on automated information-system-supported condition-based maintenance, or 
CBM+ (alternatively, Integrated Vehicle Health Management, IVHM). Such subsystems 
continuously monitor the “health condition” of other subsystems and provide warning of 
imminent malfunction/failure. If successful, such a capability should allow more 
operative mission hours and shorter and less time-consuming and costly repairs. Success 
depends on the trustworthiness of the CBM+/IVHM systems available; see [5], [6],  
and [7]. 
 This chapter considers that times or events between such system failures (during 
functional usage) are punctuated by periods of “down-time,” during which the system 
(copy or version thereof) is (a) awaiting maintenance, which may include moving, or 
being moved, to a repair facility, and awaiting the arrival of parts, instrumentation, and 
personnel, (b) undergoing diagnosis of faults and subsequent maintenance actions, or  
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(c) awaiting further operational assignment (in idle standby); items may fail or degrade 
during such waiting/idle times, and so preliminary tests may be performed prior to 
mission assignment: pre-mission testing is often done, especially with aircraft and other 
platforms. This permits the detection of imperfect repair before the mission actually is  
in progress. 
The (classical) System Availability (Ao) parameter is a measure of the capability 
of a system to begin to perform the designed-for function or mission on immediate 
“random” demand. Nominally, this would imply that the system is in state (c) above, but 
too long a sojourn of idleness, (in “cold standby”) in a hostile environment can induce 
startup unavailability. Mission availability, measuring the capability of a system to 
perform its function from demand for service until mission termination is usually of far 
more operational significance than simple Ao. The latter is too often treated—
inappropriately—as “the long-run fraction of time” (or “constant probability”) that a 
component or system is “up” or completely mission capable at the time of demand for 
operation. In reality, such a constant value may not prevail; “the” value of Ao may well 
change with time and usage, including maintenance variation between individual copies 
of a system design. Often no account is taken of system age or condition, or the variable 
mission environment that may affect it. Further, a system’s availability may be partial: 
e.g., a multi-engine vehicle can still function if degraded by the loss of one out of several 
engines. However, loss of an engine or, one of several sensors, or a communication link 
sometimes allows a modified or limited version of the intended mission to proceed until a 
replacement is furnished. Consequently, availability need not be a binary  
instantaneous concept. 
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 The object of this chapter is to describe methods in use for describing, measuring, 
testing, and improving Availability and to provide cautionary comments similar to  
those above. 
2. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
 Engineered systems of all types are composed of numbers of components 
(“parts”), subsystems, and entire systems designed to perform cooperative functions. 
Modern warfare has been said to be conducted by “systems of systems.” Such systems 
usually operate efficiently and effectively according to correct design, manufacture and 
usage. They inevitably fail or degrade with age and stress; some failure modes are 
mission and even life-threatening, and can occur with little warning. Hence,  
condition-based monitoring (CBM) and preventive maintenance (PM) are required and 
invoked; time spent in such makes the entity temporarily mission-unavailable, but can 
provide greater overall net system mission availability. 
 Systems, and especially subsystems and components, can be roughly  
categorized as 
• One-Shot/Disposable (e.g., fuel, ammunition, missiles or mines, electronic 
components such as computer chips or screens, remote vulnerable sensors, 
etc.); and/or 
• Repairable (Segmentally) - Replaceable (e.g., failure-prone engines and 
control devices, vehicle chassis, computer hardware, elements of 
communication networks, etc.). An injured or wounded human can 
sometimes be included in this category, as being part of an entire system. 
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 In many cases, a failed repairable system becomes less susceptible to repair if too 
much time elapses, so the particular item’s availability terminates, but its function is 
performed by a replacement or substitute; the latter can be a redesigned upgrade; see [1]. 
Further, the pattern of component/system usage can vary: many items, such as some 
sensors and alarm systems and engines and generators, are normally running or “hot” 
during a mission, so if failure occurs or becomes imminent, symptoms are evident. Others 
are normally inactive or “cold,” such as an idle aircraft parked on a flight deck, or a 
rescue vehicle. 
 Many systems are made up of complex assemblies or combinations of  
One-Shot/Disposable and Repairable/Replaceable subsystems: a vehicle or platform 
burns fuel and may fire ammunition, both disposable, but its chassis, propulsion, and 
steering and sensors and communications are very often repairable/replaceable. Many 
vehicles operate in groups: convoys of trucks or small boats, task groups, aircraft 
squadrons, etc.; here the mission may involve all elements of the group, so the timely 
availability of such a subforce at a particular site can be spoiled if just one of the member 
elements fails: the entire system may become mission-incapable or unavailable if one or 
more of such elements fails or is damaged by opponent action (when in military or 
homeland protection application), or by owner/user mishandling. The tendency for such 
to occur is enhanced when hostilities occur, and when the sustainment/support forces and 
logistics are overwhelmed and themselves unavailable. 
3. MODELING AVAILABILITY 
 System availability has been characterized probabilistically or stochastically for 
many years; an initial classic is [8], but aspects of repairable system availability go far 
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back to Erlang, Khinchine, and to Palm in the 1930s and a further few decades, well 
summarized in [9] as the “repairman problem” or service-system. See also [10] and [11] 
on survival analysis, essentially summarizing biological (e.g., animal, human 
“reliability”); failure-prone, but repairable, systems resemble biological epidemics: 
failures of subsystems can stress, or infect, other subsystems that, in turn, can cause total 
system collapse if not quickly isolated and mitigated. 
 The simplest analytical model for a failure prone, but repairable, system is the 
alternating renewal process (see, however, practical cautions in Section 1). Letting a 
sequence of up-times, { }iU , and a sequence of down-times,{ }iD , be independent 
sequences of independent random variables with marginal distributions ( );F u θU  and 
( );G v ϕD , respectively, and θ  and ϕ  representing parameters; then, if ( )A t is the 
availability at time t , given that the subsystem starts at the beginning of an up period, 
1U , say, we have the backward recurrence renewal equation 
( ) { } { } ( )1 1 1
0
t
A t P t P dx A t x= > + + ∈ −∫U U D ,            (1) 
which can be solved numerically or in terms of Laplace-Stieltjes transforms. Basic 
renewal theory asymptotics, [12], Chapter 11, shows that if [ ]E U  and [ ]E D  exist/are 
finite, then 
( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]( )lim / Ao
t
A t E E E→∞ = + =U U D              (2) 
the popular (often misused) operational availability. In cases in which the system must 











an asymptotic renewal theory result. 
 Complex systems, starting with Series/Tandem configurations, and extending to 
Series/Parallel/Redundant combinations can be mathematically analyzed under the 
initially stated independence assumptions, and with these progressively relaxed. 
4. STATISTICAL INFERENCE ON AVAILABILITY 
 If the simple assumption of mutually independent sequences of independent 
identically distributed (iid) up-time r.v.s, { }iU  and likewise iid down times, { }iD  is 
(provisionally) acceptable then alternating renewal theory shows that the long-run point 
availability is given by [ ] [ ] [ ]( )Ao /E E E= +U U D , provided expectations exist. A 
natural estimate of Ao, ( )Ao /u u d= + , where u  and d are the sample averages of up 
and down realizations; assume no censoring; [13] assesses confidence intervals for Ao 
using jackknifing, wherein the Logit transform of Ao  is recomputed, omitting pairs of 
observations successively. The method is applied with good success to various redundant 
systems and several plausible distributional forms. An alternative would be the bootstrap 
(see [14]). A sensible (semi) nonparametric approach is the nonparametric bootstrap: 
resample from the empirical distributions of up-and-down times, provided that 
preliminary examination of the data does not wildly contradict iid assumptions; see [15]. 
In many applied situations, data may be insufficient to validate (or invalidate) such an 
assumption at all conclusively. It may well be wise to adaptively smooth up and  




 Many more, and more complex, results are available from the references. For an 
excellent general overview see [16]. 
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